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This study examines the effect of Unusual Market Activity (UMA) announcement on stock 
return in Malaysian market with a sample of 62 companies listed on the ACE market at 
Bursa Malaysia for the period of 2007-2015. This study employs event study methodology 
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cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) are statistically significant. In addition, this 
study also further investigates the abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return 
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ranges from 4% to 234%. Hence, it is not advisable for investors to buy stock after UMA 
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1 Introduction  
The announcements of Unusual Market Activities (UMA) by Bursa Malaysia are increasing 
over the years. UMA signals a high probability that the stocks announced are being 
manipulated. Hence, UMA announcement brings a similar definition and acts as a proxy 
for market manipulation. Huang, Chen and Cheng (n.d) asserted that manipulation can be 
happened in a many ways, from insiders taking actions that stimulus stock price to the 
proclamation of incorrect news or rumours in the internet. Stock manipulation of false news 
was spread out, causing investors to sell or buy based on inaccurate information. The 
manipulators then traded in the opposite direction to gain profit. Now, with the 
advancement of internet creation, false news could spread faster and wider using internet 
message board and other social media. The efficiency of internet with faster and wider 
spread of false news hence brings a larger effect to the investors (Leinweber & Madhavan, 
2001).  
 
The possibility that the markets can be manipulated is an imperative issue for both the 
efficiency of the market and the regulation of trading. Particularly securities in many Asian 
stock markets are thinly traded and thus they are more vulnerable to manipulation. This is 
because legal enforcement is weak, manipulation is still rampant in many emerging markets 
(Huang, Chen & Cheng, n.d). Manipulation of stock is illegal and it is impermissible under 
the regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to protect investors.  
 
On the other aspect, there is debatable that market misconduct such as price manipulation 
can be utilised to gain profit. Arbitrageurs may quickly take advantage of any mispricing if 
the market is efficient, moving prices into equilibrium conditions. However, very limited 
researches have been discussed on the announcement of unusual market activity, although 
numerous researches had been carried out on the wealth effect from corporate 
announcement. Hence, this study is motivated by the importance of market efficiency on 
unusual market activity and scarce literature available in this particular issue in Malaysia.  
 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no empirical study on UMA announcement is 
detected in Malaysia. It is unknown as of whether there is any profitable finding opportunity 
for investors after UMA announcement. Therefore, it is interesting to find out the impact 
of UMA announcement to the underlying stock return in Malaysia. Notably, out of the 225 
UMAs announced from 2007 to 2015, 64 happened in the ACE market. ACE market 
involves smaller capital stocks, which increases chances of manipulation (Hanafi, 2010). 
Besides, Zhao (2014) stated that “pump-and-dump” scheme where the stock price, trading 
volume and price volatility surges significantly, often happen for small-cap stocks because 
of its low selling and buying interest and short sale constraints. As such, samples from ACE 
market are analysed in this study. Results are believed to be beneficial to researchers, 
investors and market regulators.  
 
 
2  Literature Review 
Studies on the impact of UMA on stock return are relatively rare compared to corporate 
announcement studies. Two studies on UMA are worth mentioning. Firstly, Hanafi (2010) 
investigated price and trading behaviour of stocks involved in the announcement of unusual 
market activity in Indonesia market. It is found that abnormal returns and trading activities 
increase on the days leading to positive unusual market activity announcement. Conversely, 
abnormal returns and trading activities decrease on the days leading to negative unusual 
market activity announcement. Besides, it is also told that trading characteristic of unusual 
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market activity stocks are varying from those of matched stocks but alike to those of 
abnormal-return-matched stocks. 
 
The second study of UMA announcement study was conducted by Yanuarti and Mulyono 
(2012). They examined the effect of unusual moving activity announcement on stock return 
and trading volume in Indonesia stock exchange. They noted that stock returns are different 
before and after the UMA Announcement. Stock return is greater before UMA than after 
UMA. Moreover, in their finding, trading volume activity is not statistically affected by 
UMA announcement. It is the same before and after the announcement. 
 
Other than UMA announcement, Huang et al. (n.d) conducted a research on stock 
manipulation and its effect on market quality in Taiwan. They documented abnormal return 
of the manipulated stocks are more than 70 percent, which is very high in the developed 
markets but similar to emerging market circumstances. Subsequently, they inferred stock 
manipulation create market inefficiency which lead to both abnormally high trading volume 
and volatility, worsen the market depth, and thus impact on market quality. Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) explored price manipulation on the Pakistan stock market. They found that 
brokers could earn annual rates of return in between 50-90% higher than outside investors. 
Furthermore, they found convincing evidence for a specific trade-based ‘‘pump and dump’’ 
price manipulation scheme. Colluding brokers trade among themselves when prices are low 
to artificially raise prices and attract positive-feedback traders. Then they exit once prices 
have risen and leave the latter to suffer the following price fall. On the other hand, Rhode 
and Strumpf (2007) conducted a study on manipulating political stock markets. They 
pointed out that prices are initially moved by the speculative attack, but these changes were 
undone quickly and prices returned close to previous levels. They also found little evidence 
that political stock markets could be analytically manipulated beyond short time periods. 
Azzam and Karlquist (2008) examined the market reactions to announcements of 
allegations of corporate misconduct on Swedish market. They made a conclusion that firms 
being sued for violation experienced a significant negative wealth loss of 1.39% followed 
with the announcement of the illegality. Moreover, Kaltchev (2009) studied the impact of 
securities litigation to stock returns in the U.S. market. It is observed that stock react 
significantly negative to litigation but not overwhelming. Nevertheless, positive reaction to 
lawsuits can be observed sometimes but negative reaction is twice as common as positive 
reaction to lawsuits. Recently, Gerace et al. (2014) analysed stock market manipulation on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. They claimed that manipulation has negative impact on 
market efficiency measures such as the bid-ask spread and volatility due to information 
asymmetry.  
 
3 Data and Methodology 
This study uses data collected from several sources which includes the stock price and the 
UMA announcement date for each company. The initial searches of companies are from 
July 2007 to January 2015 through the Bursa Malaysia. Over this sample period, a total of 
64 UMAs from ACE market were announced. The UMAs are mainly due to unusual sharp 
change in price and sharp increase in trading volume. Nevertheless, this study only consists 
of 62 unusual market activity announcements from ACE market whereas 2 announcements 
have been excluded due to insufficient data during the period of study. Stock price daily 
data are obtained from Yahoo Finance website while information of UMA announcements 
are collected from Bursa Malaysia. According to Huang et al. (n.d) and Perry and 
Fontnouvelle (2005), the prices are all adjusted to account for dividends and other splits.  
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The market model adopted in this study assumes a linear relationship between the return of 
any stocks to the return on the market portfolio, which is mathematically expressed as 
Equation (1): 
 ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖      (1) 
 
where, ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = the expected return on stock i stock on any given day t; 𝛼𝑖 = the constant term; 𝛽𝑖 = the sensitivity of company i stock to the market returns 𝑅𝑚𝑡; 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are also known as market model parameters or regression parameters. 𝑅𝑚𝑡  = the market’s rate of return during a given period t, whereby the   KLCI 
has been employed as the market index; and  𝜇𝑖  = the random error term. 
 
In order to calculate the actual returns of each stock, the following formula is computed:  
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = (𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑃𝑖𝑡−1)𝑃𝑖𝑡−1         (2) 
 
where, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = the actual returns on company i stock on any given day t; 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = the closing price of stock i on any given day t; 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 = the closing price of stock i on previous day t-1. 
  
In the same manner, the market returns are calculated using the following formula: 
 𝑅𝑚𝑡 =  𝐾𝐿𝐶𝐼𝑡−𝐾𝐿𝐶𝐼𝑡−1𝐾𝐿𝐶𝐼𝑡−1         (3) 
 
where,  𝑅𝑚𝑡  = the market returns on any given day t; 𝐾𝐿𝐶𝐼𝑡 = the KLCI index value on any given day t; 𝐾𝐿𝐶𝐼𝑡 = the KLCI index value of the previous day t-1. 
 
The market model of expected stock return is written as follows: 
 
  𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡)       (4) 
 
The actual returns are compared with the market model expected returns in order to 
examine if UMA announcement induces any abnormal returns for each stock on each day 
in the event period. The coefficient 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept and 𝛽𝑖 is the slope of the market 
model, respectively, which are estimated over 90 days prior to the event window. The event 
period consists of 61 days around the UMA announcement date (t=-30 to +30).  Next, 
abnormal returns (AR) are calculated on each of the 61 days for each stock by using the 
following formula: 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) or 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − [𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡)]  (5) 
 
where, 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = the abnormal return on company i stock on any given day t; 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = the actual returns on company i stock on any given day t; 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖 = Ordinary least square estimations over the estimation window,  
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The abnormal return is the difference between the actual and the expected return. The 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 
can be analyzed separately for each security, but this may not be very informative as “a lot 
of stock price movements are caused by information unrelated to the event under study” 
(Jong, 2007). The data used for estimation had to be sufficiently separated in time from the 
event in question so that the parameters are not affected by event-period abnormal stock 
return. Therefore, the average abnormal returns over the sample companies for each of the 
61 days must be considered using the following formula: 
 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  1𝑁 ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑖=1  , 𝑡 = −30, … … , +30        (6) 
 
where, 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 = the average abnormal returns on a given day and N is the number of 
announcement made by the sample companies which is 62 companies.  
 
To determine the statistical significance of the 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 , most studies often take this into 
account by summing all the 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 over the time period of interest to find the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR). The CAR is a better indicator of the total impact of information 
release (Bodie et al., 2009). The average of CAR is known as the cumulative average 
abnormal return (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) and is considered over the sample companies, N, at each trading 
day.  𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 is calculated using the following Equation (7): 
 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡𝑡2𝑡=𝑡1          (7)  
 
where, 𝑡1and 𝑡2  represent researchers’ specified time windows to investigate the 
cumulative effect of UMA announcements on stock returns.  
 
Subsequently, the 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 and 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 have to be tested on their statistical significance. The 
simple t-test for 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡  is the ratio of 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 to its estimated standard deviation, ?̂?(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡). 
The standard deviation has to be estimated from the time series of 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 in the parameter 
estimation period to ensure its stability and reliability. Following Patell (1976), a lot of 
researches applied e a standardized abnormal return (SAAR) where each abnormal security 
return is normalized by its estimation period standard deviation as follows: 
 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡?̂?(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡)                (8) 
 
The standard deviation ?̂?(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) of each average abnormal return is further explained as: 
 ?̂?(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) = √ 1𝑡0−1 ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡2𝑡0𝑡=1           (9) 
 
where, 𝑡0 is the number of days in the estimation period. Thus, the day 0 of the standardized 
t-test is  
 ?̂?1 =  1√𝑁 ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑁𝑖=1                            (10)      
 
For the 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 shown in Equation (7), the test statistic is simply: 
 𝑡(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) = 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2)?̂?(𝑡1,𝑡2)                        (11) 




 ?̂?(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = √𝑙?̂?(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡)                     (12) 
 
The estimation of standard deviation for 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡  is applied in many studies (Khotari & 
Warner, 2006; Rao, 1997; Shaheen, 2006; Voon et al., 2008). l is the horizon length of the 
event period which can be calculated from 𝑡2 − 𝑡1 +  1. In this study, the l is 61 trading 
days. It must also be noted that, in the estimation of ?̂?(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡), the degree of freedom, N-1, 
is taken into account to eliminate the bias of taking deviations from the sample arithmetic 
average, 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡, instead of the unknown, true expected value, E(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) (Bodie et al., 2009). 
Once the critical value has been determined at 5% level of significance, if t is less than the 
critical value, the null hypothesis of no negative abnormal return is rejected, and vice versa.  
 
A common practice in the event study is to employed event window that consists of 60 days 
surrounding the warrants listing day, which is 30 days before (t = -30) and 30 days after (t 
= +30), whereby (t = 0) is the UMA announced date. The t refers to the number of days. 
This is to fully capture the effects of the event of interest (Liew & Puah, 2011). However, 
a wider event window allows for the effects of absorption by the market of more complex 
disclosures (Dumay & Tull, 2007). As such, a lot of researches denoted that the longer the 
estimation period, the more stable the slope 𝛽, or beta (Ray, 2010). Hence, a maximum of 
151 daily return observations, starting at day -120 and ending at day +30, is collected for 
this study (see Figure 1). The earliest 90 observations are then used to estimate the 
regression parameters 𝛼 and slope 𝛽 for each individual security in order to eliminate bias 
for the impact of the event. 
 
Figure 1: Event Study Window 
 
4  Empirical Results and Discussion 
This study attempts to contribute to the stock market study by investigating the effect of 
unusual market activity on Malaysia ACE stock market before, during and after 
announcement.  The results are presented and discussed below. 
 
4.1  Event Study of effect of UMA announcement on stock return 
Figure 2 portrays a graph of AARs on the y-axis against the trading day on the x-axis. The 
0 on x-axis indicates the unusual market activity announcement date. The observed AAR 
ranged between 7% and -5% over the event window. AAR on the day-30 is about -2.2% 
and it fluctuates in the range of -2.2% and 3%. Then it started to climb and reached about 
3.5% on day-2, 5% on day-1 and eventually reached the peak of 7% on day0, which is the 
announcement day.  This indicates that insider trading might occur during these 3 days 
before the announcement. However, AAR began to drop drastically to -2% on day1 and 
fell to the lowest -5% on day2 after the announcement being made by Bursa Malaysia. 
Nevertheless, ARR recovered at day3 but it wandered around 0% and negative 3%. This 
result brings the meaning of unusual price movement contain information rather than 
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market manipulation (Hanafi, 2010). Besides, Jiang, Mahoney and Mei (2005) implied that 
in this case, stock pools carry confirmation such as insider trading rather than pure or noisy 
price manipulation. 
 
Figure 2: Graph of AAR against Trading Day 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the graph of CAARs on y-axis against the trading day on the x-axis. A price 
run-up was evident as early as day -29, increasing slowly from -2% and reach 0% of CAAR 
at day -21. Then it continued to climb moderately from 0% to 2.5% until day -15 and 
thereafter it moved in a higher speed from 2.5% to 14% throughout day -15 to day -4. Next, 
CAAR eventually boosted sharply around day -3. During the four days leading to 
announcement from day -3 to day 0, CAAR increased by approximately 30%. In addition, 
the graph shows that CAARs are firstly decreased progressively from day 1 to day 3 after 
the announcement date at t = 0. Then, it decreased in a slower manner and touched 0% at 
day 18 and continued dropping at negative zone at day 19 to day 30. Table 1 shows the 
AARs and CAARs with their respective t-values.  
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Table 1: AARs and CAARs with their Respective t-values 
Days AAR t value for AAR CAAR t value for CAAR 
-30 -2.1706 -2.0013* -2.1706 -2.0013* 
-29 -0.7028 -0.8216 -2.8734 -2.3289* 
-28 0.2390 0.2598 -2.6344 -1.8033 
-27 0.8236 0.7225 -1.8109 -1.1379 
-26 -0.1557 -0.1324 -1.9665 -1.0477 
-25 0.6140 0.5887 -1.3526 -0.6973 
-24 0.4364 0.4806 -0.9162 -0.4097 
-23 -0.3161 -0.3677 -1.2323 -0.4977 
-22 0.8212 0.7665 -0.4111 -0.1387 
-21 0.5905 0.3794 0.1794 0.0538 
-20 1.8544 1.0953 2.0338 0.5295 
-19 -0.0772 -0.0738 1.9566 0.4975 
-18 0.6292 0.6442 2.5859 0.6126 
-17 -0.2850 -0.3555 2.3008 0.5245 
-16 -0.0881 -0.0985 2.2127 0.5198 
-15 0.2041 0.2447 2.4168 0.5356 
-14 3.0228 1.1008 5.4397 1.0015 
-13 0.6804 0.6125 6.1201 1.0385 
-12 1.1858 1.1115 7.3058 1.2116 
-11 1.0885 1.2273 8.3943 1.3686 
-10 1.8224 1.1391 10.2167 1.5267 
-9 -0.7262 -0.6675 9.4905 1.3928 
-8 1.2820 1.0149 10.7725 1.5208 
-7 -0.7079 -0.8175 10.0646 1.4210 
-6 0.3775 0.4260 10.4421 1.5203 
-5 0.8112 0.5415 11.2533 1.5773 
-4 1.0417 0.8287 12.2950 1.7286 
-3 1.9542 1.6129 14.2491 1.9785* 
-2 3.4954 2.6240* 17.7445 2.4256* 
-1 5.0971 2.1021* 22.8416 2.7418* 
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Table 1: AARs and CAARs with their Respective t-values (Continued) 
Days AAR t value for AAR CAAR t value for CAAR 
0 6.9667 1.5680 29.8083 2.8752* 
1 -2.0857 -1.0303 27.7226 2.5480* 
2 -5.3606 -3.8877* 22.3620 2.0298* 
3 0.0612 0.0462 22.4233 1.9796 
4 -2.3369 -2.1367* 20.0864 1.7479 
5 -2.1760 -2.1399* 17.9103 1.5624 
6 -0.9734 -0.7066 16.9369 1.5103 
7 -2.2922 -2.2580* 14.6448 1.2870 
8 -2.0161 -1.5224 12.6287 1.1034 
9 -0.5973 -0.3410 12.0313 1.0701 
10 -3.2170 -2.5147* 8.8143 0.7770 
11 -2.2326 -2.1859* 6.5817 0.5683 
12 -1.6610 -1.8095 4.9207 0.4267 
13 -0.0606 -0.0567 4.8601 0.4137 
14 -1.2577 -1.3986 3.6024 0.3039 
15 -1.1397 -1.3039 2.4627 0.2091 
16 -0.3982 -0.3549 2.0644 0.1737 
17 -0.4226 -0.5203 1.6418 0.1356 
18 -1.3351 -0.8100 0.3067 0.0248 
19 -0.9253 -1.0958 -0.6186 -0.0496 
20 -2.6798 -2.4806* -3.2983 -0.2601 
21 -2.2776 -1.5869 -5.5760 -0.4310 
22 -1.2149 -1.6057 -6.7909 -0.5186 
23 -0.1371 -0.1111 -6.9280 -0.5275 
24 -1.7970 -1.7505 -8.7250 -0.6506 
25 -1.1388 -1.4755 -9.8637 -0.7387 
26 -0.3104 -0.4057 -10.1741 -0.7534 
27 -0.4072 -0.4507 -10.5814 -0.7757 
28 -1.1823 -1.2109 -11.7636 -0.8560 
29 -0.2431 -0.2754 -12.0068 -0.8708 
30 -1.7509 -1.8226 -13.7577 -0.9849 
Note:  Asterisks (*) denote significant at 5% level. 
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Table 1 shows that 9 days are found to have negative AAR and 21 days to have positive 
AAR within the pre-announcement period. Nonetheless, there was only 1 day with positive 
AAR and the remaining 29 days were having negative ARR in the post-announcement 
period with the exclusion of event day. In addition, the event day displays a positive AAR. 
Besides, out of these 61 days, only 3 days (day -30, -2, -1) before the announcement and 7 
days (day 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 20) after the announcement are discovered to be statistically 
significant in the confidence level of 95%. 
 
Since there are only few days are discovered to be statically significant, the t-statistic of 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) should be considered. Thus, looking at 
Table 1, 9 days were found continuously generating negative continuously CAARs in the 
pre-announcement period, which are day -30 to day -22. Moreover, 40 days of continuous 
positive CAAR were revealed from day -21 in the pre-announcement period to day 18 in 
the post-announcement period, which this includes the announcement day too. 
Subsequently, 12 days of negative CAAR were displayed from day 19 to day 30 in the post-
announcement period. Throughout these 61 days, 5 days (day -30, -29, -3, -2, -1) were 
found to be statistical significant before the announcement and 2 days (day 1 and day 2) 
are found to be statistical significant in the confidence level of 95% after the announcement. 
Additionally, on the announcement day, i.e., day 0, CAAR was also found to be statistically 
significant. In addition, CAARS from day -3 to day 2 were all significant.  
 
4.2  Analysis for individual company with unusual increasing volume and/or 
price 
Given that only 10 days and 8 days were found statistically significant in AAR and CAAR 
respectively, this study further explores the analysis abnormal return (AR) and cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) of each company. Firstly, the announcements of those companies 
with unusual increasing volume and/or price are separated with the announcement of those 
companies with unusual decreasing volume and/or price.   It is found that there are 52 
companies with unusual increasing volume and/or price and 10 companies with unusual 
decreasing volume and/or price.  
 
Out of 52 companies with unusual increasing volume and/or price, it is detected that 42 
companies generate a lower CAR at day 30 after announcement. This is consistent with the 
previous analysis for UMA in whole. Stock name, stock quote, sector and the difference of 
CAR between day 0 and day 30 are shown in Table 2.  
 
Nevertheless, out of these 42 companies, only one company, which is Green Ocean 
Corporation Berhad (GOCEAN, 0074) was found to have replied to QMA query. In the 
reply, the company said its subsidiary Ace Edible Oil Industries Sdn Bhd was in the 
advance stage of negotiation to supply the whole quality cooking oil production to a 
conglomerate. Apart from Ace Edible Oil Industries' ongoing negotiation, Green Ocean 
was not aware of any other development that could contribute to the UMA after making 
due enquire with its directors and major shareholders.  
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Table 2: Stock details for companies with a lower CAR at day 30 after 
announcement of unusual increasing volume and/or price  















1 0133 SANICHI IND-PROD -13.06 -39.41 -26.35 
2 0104 GENETEC TECHNOLOGY -238.62 -472.86 -234.23 
3 0122 AIM TRAD/SERV 33.80 -67.96 -101.76 
4 0122 AIM TRAD/SERV -132.58 -197.71 -65.13 
5 0140 UTOPIA TRAD/SERV -78.17 -90.93 -12.76 
6 0024 JAG IND-PROD 18.78 -52.07 -70.85 
7 0111 K1 TECHNOLOGY 71.33 43.91 -27.42 
8 0034 INGENCO TECHNOLOGY 45.39 -116.63 -162.02 
9 0036 KGROUP TECHNOLOGY 141.44 53.14 -88.30 
10 0045 GNB TECHNOLOGY 64.69 -56.70 -121.39 
11 0109 FLONIC IND-PROD 17.45 -81.34 -98.79 
12 0133 SANICHI IND-PROD 127.66 78.83 -48.83 
13 0140 UTOPIA TRAD/SERV 55.41 4.59 -50.82 
14 0055 SERSOL IND-PROD 105.59 93.17 -12.42 
15 0060 TMS TECHNOLOGY 122.09 22.07 -100.02 
16 0060 TMS TECHNOLOGY 114.01 66.52 -47.49 
17 0074 GOCEAN TECHNOLOGY 155.12 133.91 -21.21 
18 0022 OCPO TECHNOLOGY 92.27 59.11 -33.17 
19 0116 FOCUS TECHNOLOGY 65.88 1.23 -64.65 
20 0034 INGENCO TECHNOLOGY -10.35 -84.77 -74.42 
21 0001 SCOMNET  IND-PROD 138.17 34.55 -103.61 
22 0020 NETX  TECHNOLOGY 164.83 87.46 -77.37 
23 0022 CYBERT TECHNOLOGY 57.10 16.00 -41.10 
24 0034 INGENCO TECHNOLOGY 53.27 -16.10 -69.37 
25 0034 INGENCO TECHNOLOGY 120.54 -14.83 -135.37 
26 0133 SANICHI IND-PROD 22.70 -65.42 -88.11 
27 0036 KGROUP TECHNOLOGY 101.90 -10.09 -111.99 
28 0106 REXIT TECHNOLOGY 65.25 -9.47 -74.72 
29 0152 DGB TECHNOLOGY 59.10 6.57 -52.53 
30 0024 JAG IND-PROD 48.08 36.25 -11.83 
31 0119 APPASIA TECHNOLOGY 136.57 90.48 -46.09 
32 0034 INGENCO TECHNOLOGY 1.46 -7.05 -8.51 
33 0140 UTOPIA TRAD/SERV -3.66 -46.63 -42.96 
34 0162 IJACOBS IND-PROD 38.65 -1.15 -39.80 
35 0081 IDEAL TRAD/SERV 54.47 10.44 -44.04 
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Table 2: Stock details for companies with a lower CAR at day 30 after announcement 
of unusual increasing volume and/or price (Continued) 















37 0113 MMSV TECHNOLOGY 25.24 21.24 -3.99 
38 0086 YGL TECHNOLOGY 4.14 -64.04 -68.18 
39 0026 NOVAMSC TECHNOLOGY 18.61 -19.45 -38.07 
40 0050 SYSTECH TECHNOLOGY 74.23 55.11 -19.11 
41 0023 IFCAMSC TECHNOLOGY -12.34 -50.60 -38.26 
42 0050 SYSTECH TECHNOLOGY 12.82 -29.31 -42.13 
 
 
On the other hand, 10 out of 52 companies were detected to generate a higher CAR at day 
30 after announcement with unusual increasing volume and/or price. It was found that there 
are 10 individual stocks had generated higher return at day 30 after announcement. Thus, 
it is not necessarily that stocks return will just drop dramatically after UMA announcement. 
However, none of these companies reply to the UMA query. As such, it is unknown as of 
why the CAR kept increasing after announcement. Stock name, stock quote, stock sector 
and the difference of CAR between day 0 and day 30 are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Stock details for companies with a higher CAR at day 30 after 
announcement of unusual increasing volume and/or price  















1 0133 SANICHI IND-PROD 65.42 134.59 69.18 
2 0020 NETX  TECHNOLOGY 59.92 177.52 117.60 
3 0165 XOX TRAD/SERV 90.61 97.16 6.55 
4 0060 TMS TECHNOLOGY -46.46 -24.16 22.30 
5 0103 MNC TECHNOLOGY 63.59 104.68 41.09 
6 0093 SOLUTN TECHNOLOGY 95.77 97.41 1.64 
7 0055 SERSOL IND-PROD 53.32 125.78 72.46 
8 0034 INGENCO TECHNOLOGY 6.74 12.67 5.93 
9 0080 RAYA TRAD/SERV 72.23 85.58 13.35 
10 0023 IFCAMSC TECHNOLOGY 73.92 94.53 20.61 
 
4.3  Analysis for individual company with unusual decreasing volume and/or 
price 
 
After investigated companies with unusual increasing volume and/or price, this study also 
further investigates for those companies under UMA queries of unusual drop in price and/or 
volume.  There were 10 companies with unusual decreasing price and/or volume. Out of 
these 10 companies with unusual drop in price and/or volume, it was detected that 7 
companies generated a lower CAR at day 30 after announcement.  This is consistent with 
the previous analysis for UMA in whole. Stock name, stock quote, sector and the difference 
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of CAR between day 0 and day 30 are shown in Table 4. Out of these seven stocks, no 
company had reply to the UMA query. 
 
Table 4: Stock details for companies with a lower CAR at day 30 after announcement 
of unusual drop in price and/or volume  















1 0086 YGL TECHNOLOGY -209.74 -323.53 -113.78 
2 0095 XINGHE CONSUMER -53.09 -92.40 -39.31 
3 0034 INGENCO TECHNOLOGY -44.83 -111.79 -66.96 
4 0022 CYBERT TECHNOLOGY -134.52 -262.67 -128.15 
5 0055 SERSOL IND-PROD -93.44 -126.28 -32.83 
6 0072 AT IND-PROD -12.51 -67.86 -55.36 
7 0120 VIS TECHNOLOGY -42.25 -124.32 -82.06 
 
Additionally, 3 out of 10 companies were detected to generate a higher CAR at day 30 after 
announcement with unusual drop in price and/or volume. All these 3 stocks had not reply 
to the UMA query. However, their CAR was better at day 30 after the announcement. 
Therefore, it shows to investors that they do not necessary have to be panic and turn out 
selling their stocks immediately after the announcement of UMA. Stock name, stock quote, 
stock sector and the difference of CAR between day 0 and day 30 are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Stock details for companies with a higher CAR at day 30 after announcement 
of unusual drop in price and/or volume  















7 0103 MNC TECHNOLOGY -30.10 -14.85 15.25 
8 0150 ASIABIO TRAD/SERV 6.04 16.60 10.56 
10 0103 MNC TECHNOLOGY -51.85 6.98 58.83 
 
5  Conclusion and Policy implication  
Table 6 shows the average abnormal return (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) for the significant days. Throughout the 61 days of event period, a total of 10 days 
were discovered to be statistically significant for the AARs. 3 days (day -30, -2, -1) before 
the announcement and 7 days (day 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 20) after the announcement were 
discovered to be statistically significant in the confidence level of 95%. During the pre-
announcement, day -30 was found to have negative AAR while day -2 and day -1 were 
found to have positive AARs. In addition, all the 7 days in the post-announcement revealed 
negative AARs.  
 
Furthermore, CAARs were found to be statistically significant for a total of 8 days. Out of 
these 8 days, 5 days had statistically significant CAARs before the announcement (day -30, 
-29, -3, -2, -1) and 2 days had statistically significant CAARs after the announcement (day 
1 and 2). Additionally, on the announcement day, i.e., day 0, CAAR was also found to be 
statistically significant. In addition, CAARS from day -3 to day 2 were all significant. 
Moreover, only day -30 and day -29 were discovered to have negative CAARs while the 
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rest of the days (day -3 to day 2) were having positive CAARs. The results are consistent 
with Hanifi (2010) and Yanuarti and Mulyono (2013). In their studies, stock returns for 
Indonesia market are affected by UMA announcement.  
 
 
Table 6: AARs and CAARs with their Respective t-values 
Days AAR t value for AAR Days CAAR t value for CAAR 
-30 -2.1706 -2.0013* -30 -2.1706 -2.0013* 
-2 3.4954 2.6240* -29 -2.8734 -2.3289* 
-1 5.0971 2.1021* -3 14.2491 1.9785* 
2 -5.3606 -3.8877* -2 17.7445 2.4256* 
4 -2.3369 -2.1367* -1 22.8416 2.7418* 
5 -2.1760 -2.1399* 0 29.8083 2.8752* 
7 -2.2922 -2.2580* 1 27.7226 2.5480* 
10 -3.2170 -2.5147* 2 22.3620 2.0298* 
11 -2.2326 -2.1859*    
20 -2.6798 -2.4806*    
Note:  Asterisks (*) denote significant at 5% level. 
 
Besides, this study also further investigates on individual company. It was found that there 
are 52 companies with unusual increasing volume and/or price and 10 companies with 
unusual decreasing volume and/or price. Out of 52 companies with unusual increasing 
volume and/or price, it was detected that 42 companies generate a lower CAR 30 days after 
announcement. This is consistent with the general analysis for UMA. Nevertheless, out of 
these 42 companies, only one company, which is Green Ocean Corporation Berhad 
(GOCEAN, 0074) was found to reply to QMA query. However, the CAR at the day 30 was 
still ended with 21% lower than announcement day. In addition, 10 out of 52 companies 
were detected to generate a higher CAR at day 30.  
 
Moreover, out of 10 companies with unusual drop in price and/or volume, it was detected 
that 7 companies were generating a lower CAR at day 30 after announcement. Additionally, 
3 out of 10 companies were detected to generate a higher CAR at day 30 after 
announcement with unusual drop in price and/or volume. 
 
The findings of the significant impacts of UMA on stock in this study suggests that policy 
makers and regulators such as Bursa Malaysia and Security Commission should continue 
to pay attention to UMA as these two institutions play crucial role in solving and preventing 
the rising issues of UMA, in order to protect investors’ wealth. Furthermore, investors and 
shareholders must be aware of the reply to query from the announcement of UMA. 
Investors and shareholders shall not be intimidated by UMA announcement and sell their 
share immediately. It is not necessarily that share price will drop immediately after the 
announcement. Some of them actually rise instead of fall. However, investors must take 
note that majority of the stock returns falls substantially eventually at the end of 30 days 
after the UMA announcement.  Hence, it is not advisable for investors to buy stock after 
UMA announcement. 
 
Moreover, management team of the companies which involved in the query of unusual 
market activity should also be aware and take concern on the announcement. A satisfying 
answer from the management team will reflect the responsibility of the company towards 
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unexpected incident and subsequently increase the confidence level of the investors. In 
return, the share price would not be falling or falling less because the panics of the investors 
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